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A Naturally Supportive Environment? 
The European Institutions and Germany Reunification 
 
At first sight the international discussions and negotiations which surrounded the 
reunification of Germany and the end of the Cold War in Europe could be seen as a 
partial return to traditional great power diplomacy.  Faced with great questions about 
Europe’s overall balance and shape, and Germany’s place within this new Europe, the 
smaller European powers found themselves all but banished to the margins as the 
traditionally dominant players reasserted their influence.  The 2+4 mechanism in 
particular looks superficially like a return to the diplomacy of the immediate post-war 
era, albeit with a more active role for the Germans themselves than was either possible or 
likely in the late 1940s.  The rhetoric of Mrs Thatcher and some of her fellow leaders 
meanwhile, with their constant references to the German problem and the dangers that an 
unbound Germany might pose to the whole international status quo, also have an element 
of time-warp about them.  Some of the Iron Lady’s sentiments recalled the views of that 
generation of British leaders – Clement Attlee, Anthony Eden or Harold Macmillan – 
whose perceptions of Germany had been shaped by both World Wars and by decades of 
deep Anglo-German antagonism.  After all the hyperbole of the mid-1980s when 
European integration appeared to have rediscovered its dynamism, the events of 1989-90 
might thus be used as evidence that the deeper realities of European diplomacy had not 
altered nearly as fundamentally as some of the enthusiasts for integration believed.  On 
closer inspection, however, it becomes apparent that traditional great power diplomacy 
had not succeeded entirely in displacing European multilateralism.  For alongside the 
resurgence of power politics à l’ancienne, there was also a significant element of newer, 
multilateral European dialogue and cooperation.  There is thus ample scope for a study of 
the European institutions and the question of German reunification. 
 This paper will set itself three basic tasks.  First of all it will seek to establish how 
the institutions of the European Community reacted to the events in Berlin and East 
Germany and then move on to suggest a number of factors which might explain why the 
collective EC reaction was rather less cautious – not to say churlish – than that of several 
of the individual member states.  Second, it will trace the way in which this relatively 
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positive reaction was translated into Community action on the issue.  Or to put it another 
way, what did the European institutions contribute to the unfolding of Germany unity 
during the eleven month period between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the achievement 
of Germany unity?  And third, the paper will seek to establish what effect the whole 
process of German reunification had on the subsequent trajectory of European 
integration.  Did Brussels reap the rewards of its early and positive reaction to events in 
Berlin?  Or would the clear-sightedness shown by Jacques Delors and his colleagues in 
the immediate aftermath of November 9, 1989 prove to be a short-term triumph only?  
Throughout the paper, the focus will primarily be on the two European institutions that 
mattered most in this affair – namely the European Commission and the European 
Council – although a few comments will also be made about the role and position of both 
the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers.  
 
‘Un ami du peuple allemand’ – Delors and November 9th 
Jacques Delors, the President of the European Commission, could justifiably lay claim to 
having been one of the first active European politicians to react in an entirely positive 
manner to the fall of the Berlin Wall.   Even before the moment when the Wall came 
down, he had made a speech in Bonn, in which he had departed from the prepared text 
and confronted the question of German reunification head-on adding: ‘La Communauté 
européenne offre le cadre le plus réaliste à cette perspective, à la condition d’affermir son 
essor et de renforcer encore son attrait.  Ainsi notre Communauté, votre Communauté, a 
rendez-vous avec tous les Allemands.  Pour vous rencontrer, n’a-t-elle-pas déjà accompli 
un chemin irréversible ?’1  He was thus well prepared to talk to the German press on 
November 12.  Asked how he envisaged the role of the Community in the new situation 
created by the fall of the Wall, he responded: ‘D’abord je voudrais vous dire que je 
partage avec nos amis allemands leur émotion, leurs joies et leurs espoirs.  La 
Communauté européenne est le centre de gravité de l’histoire de l’Europe.  C’est vers elle 
que regardent les habitants de la République Démocratique Allemande, de Pologne et de 
Hongrie.  Nous ne devons pas les décevoir, nous devons leur offrir notre aide et notre 
                                                 
1
 Jacques Delors, Mémoires (Paris: Plon, 2004), p.277 
 3 
coopération.’2  Similar sentiments were repeated to journalists of many other nationalities 
in the days that followed.  Furthermore, Delors also appeared immune from doubts that 
afflicted many of his fellow leaders once it became clear, at the very end of 1989 and the 
first weeks of 1990, that the timetable for actual reunification was likely to be much 
shorter than originally foreseen.  On January 9th an interview he gave on the topic to the 
Irish Times attracted a favourable response within the Kanzleramt.3  And a week later his 
speech to the European Parliament setting out the Commission’s priorities for the year 
ahead made clear his willingness to see and to assist a rapid move towards Germany 
unity.  East Germany he reminded MEPs had always had a special status within the EC – 
the Treaty of Rome contained several protocols dealing with Berlin and the Soviet zones 
of Germany – and while it was up to the Germans themselves to choose the form and the 
manner of reunification the Community should not hesitate to welcome the additional 
population: ‘elle [East Germany] a sa place dans la Communauté, si elle le demande, 
pour peu que ce processus se réalise, comme la rappelée le Conseil européen de 
Strasbourg à travers une libre autodétermination, pacifiquement et démocratiquement, 
dans le respect des principes de l’acte final de Helsinki, dans un contexte de dialogue Est-
Ouest et dans la perspective de l’intégration européenne.’4  Brussels would not stand in 
the way of whatever was decided in Bonn.  The contrast with the ill-concealed distaste of 
Mrs Thatcher towards rapid reunification, or even with the hesitation which President 
Mitterrand was to show in publicly affirming his support, was very striking indeed.5 
 Part of the explanation for the rapidity of Delors’ acceptance of the idea of 
reunification can doubtless be found in the personal rapport between the Commission 
President and the German Chancellor.  The two men had already developed an effective 
working relationship over a number of the key European debates of the late 1980s and 
Delors was particularly conscious of the debt that he owed Helmut Kohl following the 
successful conclusion of the so-called Delors I budgetary package of 1987.  Without the 
Chancellor’s political backing – and willingness to shoulder a significant portion of the 
increased costs – this vital component of the Community’s revival in the latter half of the 




 Horst Teltschik, 329 Tage.  Innenansichten der Einigung (Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 1991), p.102 
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decade would not have been possible.  Support for reunification was thus in a sense an 
opportunity for Delors to return the favour.  But a full explanation needs to go beyond 
this theory – however appealing. 
 For a start there was a certain element of pragmatism in the Commission 
President’s stance.  The Brussels institution wields little direct power and knows full well 
that it can only exercise influence if it is able to maintain strong links with those who 
actually possess the capacity to take key decisions within the EC, namely the national 
governments.  Adopting a position which might alienate the Community’s largest and 
richest member state was thus not a risk to be taken lightly.  Conversely, cementing 
further a Bonn-Brussels relationship would stand the Commission in very good stead in 
all future Community controversies.  Supporting Bonn at a time when other allies were 
proving less than reliable thus made good tactical sense for Delors and the Commission.  
Calculations of this sort were flanked by a genuine enthusiasm for the transformations 
occurring in Eastern and Central Europe.  In a speech to the College of Europe in mid-
October, the Commission President had waxed lyrical about the changes underway in 
Warsaw, Budapest and elsewhere, changes which he asserted reflected in part the 
gravitational pull of the European Community and which strengthened the case for more 
European integration rather than less.6  In such circumstances, it would have been 
somewhat illogical to have objected strongly as the largest domino of all in Eastern 
Europe, the GDR, toppled over.  (Although it is of course true that some leaders like the 
British Prime Minister were illogical in precisely this way.) 
 There was also what could perhaps be described as a more structural reason why 
the Commission reacted in the way that it did.  The Commission it should be recalled was 
a real newcomer to the field of East-West relations and European political, as opposed to 
commercial or economic, diplomacy – indeed one of the manifest sources of Delors’ 
enthusiasm for the changes underway was precisely the way in which he perceived these 
as an entrée for the institution into fields of activity from which it had been previously 
excluded.7  As a result it had little background in traditional diplomacy and almost 
entirely lacked staff with extensive experience of cold war and geopolitical issues.  Many 
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of those assigned tasks connected for instance to the Commission’s new mandate to 
coordinate the G-24 effort to organise aid to Eastern Europe had little relevant experience 
and were instead recycled agricultural or commercial experts.  In most respects this was a 
disadvantage – and a cause for concern.8 But it did mean that unlike many within the 
Quai d’Orsay, the Foreign Office, or the Farnesina those responsible for discussing the 
Commission’s response to the events of 1989 had not spend their careers working within 
an environment where discussions of the ‘German problem’ or the various scenarios 
under which Germany might be unified and the manner in which this might disrupt 
Europe’s geopolitical balance remained common currency.  Instead they were much more 
likely to approach the issue with little eye to the past and a much greater openness to the 
emotions and excitement generated by the fall of the Wall – the sort of ‘common sense’ 
reaction also shown by a significant percentage of the European general public but much 
less widespread amongst diplomats and foreign policy experts.  To put it perhaps more 
simply, the European Commission had no institutional memory of Germany as a problem 
for Europe.  On the contrary, the Germany with which most of the Commission had had 
experience of dealing was the least problematical of the larger member states – less 
inclined to throw its weight about in a disruptive manner than Britain or France, and 
better at implementing Community law than either Italy or France -, the biggest 
contributor to the Community budget, the economic dynamo pushing forward Europe’s 
economic revival in the late 1980s, and an enthusiastic supporter of many of the 
institutional reforms at a European level which the Commission was most eager to see – 
notably greater powers for the European Parliament .  Seen from this perspective greater 
German power and influence was thus a welcome prospect rather than a threat.  A 20% 
increase in the size of Britain or France would have been a much greater cause for alarm 
in Brussels than an increase in German power!  Delors’ personal instincts on this issue 
were thus almost certainly backed up by similar reactions amongst his staff.  This was all 
the more likely to have been the case, given that the Commission shared many of the 
Federal Republic government’s own over-optimistic assumptions about how quickly the 
costs of reunification could be covered and the benefits of a greater population might 
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begin to accrue.9  German reunification was hence seen in Brussels as a likely source of 
medium term economic dynamism rather than as something which would adversely 
affect the economic performance of the Federal Republic (and hence Europe as a whole) 
for over a decade to come. 
 
Collective support despite individual misgivings: the European Council and 
German reunification 
The European Council’s collective reaction to November 9 and to the events that 
followed can also be described as reasonably positive.  This may at first sight appear a 
somewhat contentious statement.  After all, the informal dinner held in Paris on 
November 18, 1989 at which the heads of government of the Twelve has an initial 
discussion of the events in Berlin is generally regarded as having been a somewhat 
fraught event with both Thatcher and Ruud Lubbers, the Dutch Prime Minister having 
made their misgivings clear.10  As Bozo notes, there was also a somewhat artificial 
avoidance of the issue of reunification itself at this dinner, since neither Kohl nor most of 
his interlocutors wanted to debate the issue albeit for rather different reasons.11  
Furthermore, the Strasbourg Council three weeks later was also far from smooth, with 
Kohl being subjected to an interrogation on the issue of German unity which made him 
feel as if he were on trial, and the European Council’s statement on the issue having 
required a delicate negotiation which took the whole of the night of December 8/9.12  It 
was thus only at Dublin in April 1990 that the assembled leaders were able to give 
German unity their blessing.  And Kohl’s retrospective relief at this development and the 
striking contrast he draws between discussions in Strasbourg and those in the Irish 
capital, do underline the efforts that he and other German leaders had gone to so as to 
reassure their European partners and the extent of the mental adjustment that Thatcher, 
Mitterrand, Andreotti and the others had been obliged to make.13   But our historical 
knowledge of how tense discussions had in fact been, should only make it more 
remarkable that the European Council managed to convey a public image of openness 
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towards and then support for the reunification of Germany.  At the Strasbourg for 
instance the Council Conclusions noted that the Twelve ‘seek the strengthening of peace 
in Europe in which the German people will regain its unity through free self-
determination’14 while in Dublin the Community’s leaders expressed their ‘rejoicing’ at 
the process of German unification.  The December 1989 summit had also mandated the 
European Commission to investigate the practical implications of Germany unity and 
prepare a Community response – a step which would finally result in the Commission 
Communication on German reunification approved by the Twelve at the Dublin 
Council.15  In both its words and its deeds, the European Council seemed thus to have 
taken a somewhat more positive line than the sentiments of some its members might have 
implied.  Given that the Council works by consensus and that its conclusions require 
unanimous approval, it is therefore worth asking why the hesitations of Thatcher and 
several of her fellow leaders were not more clearly reflected in the collective European 
response. 
 The first and the most obvious factor was clearly the presence in any collective 
European meeting of Kohl himself.  It is surely no coincidence that most of the more 
tactless and strongly worded statements of opposition to German reunification seem to 
have emerged from bilateral meetings not involving the Chancellor rather than from 
multilateral meetings at which he was present.  And while Mrs Thatcher in particular was 
a forceful enough personality not to have shrunk from making her sentiments clear, 
regardless of Kohl’s presence, it is also clear that Kohl and his many allies would never 
have allowed the emergence of any European statement that opposed or obstructed 
German reunification.  But the importance of Kohl’s presence goes beyond this ability to 
prevent overt opposition being expressed.  For West Germany was not merely a member 
state of the European Community and Kohl hence a member of the European Council; in 
the late 1980s the German Chancellor was beyond dispute the dominant member of the 
European Community’s collective leadership and someone well accustomed to exercising 
a decisive influence over the direction taken by the Twelve.  This reality reflected Kohl’s 
seniority, his role as the doyen of Christian Democrats who collectively accounted for 
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half of the EC member states, his strong links with several non-Christian Democrat 
leaders notably Mitterrand and Felipe Gonzalez, his track record in several previous 
Community negotiations notably those on the EC budget, and, most fundamentally, his 
country’s status as Europe’s largest, most geographically central, and richest member 
state.  The Chancellor was not therefore just a member of a club where all are to a certain 
extent duty bound to respect each others’ sensitivities; he was the most powerful leader 
within this club and someone whose support was much sought and whose animosity was 
much feared.   
 Germany’s centrality was further augmented by the fact that the Community was 
in the midst of rapid internal evolution.  The late 1980s were a halcyon period for 
European integration.  The relance carried out in the middle of the decade and centred on 
the creation of a fully working internal market by the end of 1992, had spilled-over into a 
much more wide-ranging advance encompassing monetary integration, discussions of 
political union, institutional reform, and the redefinition of the European Community (the 
middle ‘E’ for economic had already been de facto dropped) as an outright European 
Union.  In such circumstances virtually all of the member states had pressing issues upon 
which they needed Germany’s support or on which they feared Germany’s opposition.  
Obstructionism on the issue of German reunification was hence a stance likely to have 
serious repercussions elsewhere in the European debate.  Little wonder then that Kohl’s 
fellow leaders chose not to dig their heels in too much in Paris, Strasbourg or Dublin.  
Instead it was much more logical to do as the French Presidency did in the Strasbourg 
negotiations over the exact wording of the Council statement on German unity, and 
bargain acquiescence in a positive formula, for German support for other crucial 
European issues – in this case monetary union. 
 The context of generalised progress towards greater integration also mattered 
because it legitimised the idea of coping with German unity by means of rapid European 
advance.  The notion of la fuite en advance has a long pedigree in the history of European 
integration, going back at least as far as the 1950 proposal to launch a European Defence 
Community.  But in the late 1980s it was an option readily turned to given the speed of 
the EC’s advance.  It was thus possible for most of Kohl’s fellow leaders to comfort 
themselves with the belief that a new, reunified and more powerful Germany, would also 
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be a Germany safely contained within a new, more powerful European union.  Any 
potentially destabilising effects of Germany’s new size would be significantly reduced by 
this fact: it would, as the well-worn formula put it, be a European Germany rather than a 
German Europe.  And each of their individual ability to bargain for aspects of the new 
Europe which they held dear would be improved by preserving their relationship with 
Chancellor Kohl and not seeking to obstruct his progression towards German unity.  It 
was only Mrs Thatcher who was of course as opposed to further European integration as 
she was to German reunification, for whom this expectation provided no comfort 
whatsoever – a fact which goes a long way to explaining her eventual total isolation on 
both issues.  For everybody else the prospect of more European integration represented 
both a possible solution to many of the difficulties which reunification might pose and a 
tactical incentive to avoid outright confrontation with the single most powerful figure 
within the European Community. 
 
Enlargement without accession: the Community institutions and the absorption of 
the GDR 
The practical effects of Commission support for and European Council acquiescence in 
German reunification were felt over the next eleven months during which time the EC 
had to adjust to an increase in its and size and population without the normal, lengthy 
membership negotiations which have typically accompanied enlargements.  This process, 
although over-shadowed by the much higher profile 2+4 negotiations and ignored 
altogether by at least one supposedly authoritative account of the diplomacy of 
reunification, involved detailed talks on the margins of the 2+4 meetings between David 
Williamson, the Secretary-General of the Commission, his deputy Carlo Trojan, and 
Hans Tietmeyer, who led the German delegation finalising the international aspects of 
unification.16  Both the European Commission and the European Council were thus 
obliged to demonstrate that their verbal expressions of good will towards the unification 
process could be translated into actual negotiating flexibility and a willingness to adapt to 
a unification which ended up taking much less time than most had expected.  But in order 
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fully to appreciate the role of the Community institutions in the unification process, it is 
probably best to break it down into a number of separate components. 
 The first aspect of Community involvement in the reunification process was the 
negotiation of a trade agreement with the GDR.  Such a step brought East Germany into 
line with Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia which had also taken advantage of their 
altered political status to devise new commercial arrangements with the European 
Community.  But it also reflected the initial belief, in Brussels as much as elsewhere, that 
reunification would take much longer than it actually did.  As a result there would thus be 
some utility in revising the commercial regime between the GDR and the EC, thereby 
encouraging trade flows to anticipate political reunification and full EC membership.  
This would help make the integration of the former East Germany into the Community 
that much smoother and less disruptive.  In the event of course the acceleration of the 
reunification time-table all but overtook the negotiation of a commercial treaty, emptying 
it of much of its intended purpose.  The treaty was only signed on May 8, 1990, less than 
six months prior to date on which German reunification and the consequent enlargement 
of the European Community became a reality.17  And it was soon made redundant by the 
de facto customs union between the GDR and the Twelve planned as part of the 
transitional phase bringing the new German Länder into the Community.18  Its 
negotiation was nevertheless a first indication of the type of practical step that the EC 
was willing to take to smooth the reunification process. 
  Much more significant was the Commission’s three-stage plan drawn up to 
smooth the actual enlargement process.  Work towards this had started at the very end of 
1989, fulfilling the mandate received at Strasbourg.  In January, the so-called 
‘Bangemann Group’ was formed within the European Commission, bringing together a 
small high calibre group chaired by the German Commission Vice-President Martin 
Bangemann which would investigate the various adaptations which would be needed 
both to ready the Community for the absorption of the GDR and, where possible, to ready 
the GDR for the coming into force of European rules.  This committee would meet 
                                                 
17
 Bulletin CE, 5/90, p.74 
18
 Bulletin CE, 6/90,  
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weekly between February and July 1990.19  Its first major product was the Commission 
communication presented to the Dublin Council in late April.20 
 This document set out a three-stage plan for bringing the former DDR into the 
EC.  The first so-called interim stage was to start when the Staatsvertrag between the two 
German states entered in to force.  At this point the GDR would have to take on board 
much of West German economic legislation and in the process adapt itself to life within 
the EC as well.  The Commission would actively oversee this implementation so as to 
ensure that Community competition and state-aid rules were being met.  Also to start 
during this period was the introduction of VAT, a complete overhaul of the East German 
social security and tax systems, and the gradual introduction of a full market economy 
into the formerly communist state.  Once unification occurred, the interim phase would 
then give way to the transitional stage.  From this point Community legislation would 
apply directly to the neue Bundesländer.  In recognition of former GDR’s special 
circumstances, however, a number of special transitional arrangements could be 
negotiated, temporarily exempting eastern Germany from full Community rules.  The 
Commission expected these derogations to apply primarily to environmental rules, 
competition policy, and the introduction of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) to the 
GDR, but it was ready also to take special account of the multiple previous trade 
arrangements entered into by the former DDR primarily with other former Eastern bloc 
countries.  All of these special dispensations, as well as the transitional phase itself, 
would have to come to an end on January 1, 1993 as the full European internal market 
entered into force.  Stage III from 1993 onwards would thus see the former GDR as a 
fully-fledged part of the European single market.21 
 This plan of action was approved in Dublin by the European Council, thereby 
ushering in a further stage of Commission activity in the forms of discussions with the 
West German government about the compatibility of the Staatsvertrag and the 
Einigungsvertrag with European rules.  This reflected the Council’s desire that the 
Community be fully involved with the ongoing negotiations.  It was for this reason that 
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Williamson and Trojan found themselves in a number of meetings from May 5 onwards 
with Tietmeyer.  These resulted in several significant changes being made to the draft 
treaties.  And the Commission’s involvement also meant that its own work preparing the 
necessary authorisation for the transitional measures to be applied in stage II of the three 
stage plan could proceed on the basis of accurate and detailed knowledge about what was 
emerging in the 2+4 negotiations.  Given the subsequent acceleration of the unification 
timetable this was of great importance – as it was the Community institutions had to 
proceed with almost unprecedented speed over the summer and autumn in order to 
approve all 21 transitional measures before the interim arrangements expired on 
December 31.  In the end all of the necessary legislation had been passed by early 
November.   
 Finally in assessing the Commission’s role, some mention ought to be made to the 
aspect of Community help that did not materialise, namely that of substantial monetary 
aid.  This was something that Delors did offer Kohl, pointing out that conditions in neue 
Bundesländer were far further behind European norms in terms of affluence than was the 
case for most of those regions that already benefited from generous structural assistance.  
The German Chancellor was determined, however, to avoid a situation in which any of 
his European partners ended up paying for German unity, either through an increase in 
the total size of the Community’s budget or through a reallocation of existing funds away 
from their expected beneficiaries.22  This, it ought perhaps to be noted, was one of the last 
examples of the type of cheque book diplomacy for which Germany had become 
renowned at a European level. 
 All told, however the Commission could pride itself on having performed a 
genuinely constructive, if relatively low-profile, role within the unification process.  
Much of its work was highly technical and largely impenetrable to those not versed in the 
intricacies of European law.  But without it, the relatively smooth legal absorption into 
the Community of the five new German Länder would not have been possible.  The 
Commission President personal support for unification had clearly also been of some 
importance in discussions at Strasbourg and Dublin in particular.  Delors’ presence as one 
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of the sole non-Germans invited to the Berlin celebrations of October 2/3 was hence fully 
merited as were the warm tributes he received from Kohl.23 Likewise, the European 
Council role, while less obvious was also of some importance.  For not only did it give its 
approval to the Commission’s actions at various points thereby permitting the rapid 
drawing up of the transitional arrangements, but more fundamentally it also very publicly 
signalled European approval of Germany’s unexpectedly rapid progress towards 
reunification.  The warmth of the Dublin statement about German unity was particularly 
notable.  At a time when so much about Europe and about Germany’s place within it 
seemed to be open to negotiation, this symbolic affirmation of the compatibility between 
Germany’s national aspirations for unity and its long-standing European engagement was 
of great political importance, not least within Germany’s internal debate.  At both 
Commission and Council levels, the European dimension of German reunification was 
thus something of genuine significance. 
 
A spur to progress – or a source of new difficulties?  The effects of German 
reunification on the EC 
If there was a European dimension to the unification story, it is also the case that 
Germany’s transformation had an impact on the Community’s subsequent development.  
The final section of this paper must therefore consider the way in which the events of 
1989-90 altered the EC’s advance.  And in particular it must consider the long-debated 
question about the interconnection between German unity and economic and monetary 
union (EMU) within Europe. 
 The first and most obvious effect of German unification was on the morale and 
confidence of the Commission in general and its President in particular.  This was already 
running fairly high – as noted above the integration process had been advancing with 
some rapidity since the mid-1980s.  The transformations of 1989 and the politics of 1990 
were however to take Delors’ self-confidence to unprecedented heights.  His speech in 
January 1990 to the European Parliament is a case in point.  For while this did include a 
short passage about the possible risks and dangers to the European project posed by the 
collapse of communism in Eastern Europe – he rebutted for instance the idea that 
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European integration had been an outgrowth of the cold war and should therefore cease 
as the cold war came to an end – the vast majority of the speech was illustrative of the 
excitement and ambition with which the Commission President regarded the future.  And 
nowhere was this more so than in the field of foreign policy where it is quite clear that he 
perceived the Community as whole but the Commission in particular playing an ever 
greater role.  The surprise decision at the G-7 summit in July 1989 to entrust the task of 
chairing the G-24 committee for coordinating relief to Eastern Europe to the European 
Commission was perceived, it would appear from this speech, as just the start of the 
Commission’s emergence as a key foreign policy player.   
 Almost inevitably such soaring ambitions were to provoke a member state 
reaction.  This paper is clearly not the place to rehearse in any detail the complex 
intergovernmental negotiations which were to culminate in the Maastricht treaty of 
December 1991.  It is clear however that one of the many reasons why the member states 
were to devise the complicated three pillar structure of the European Union so detested 
by Delors was to control the ever more grandiose aspirations of the Commission to play a 
role in the foreign policy field.  Few member states were willing to envisage the 
Commission playing the sort of diplomatic and external political part dreamt of by Delors 
in January 1990.  As a result, while the French Commission President was to be spared 
the fate of his equally over-ambitious predecessor, Walter Hallstein, and was able to 
serve out the remainder of his term in Brussels, his final years were marked by a strong 
element of frustration at the way in which his wings had been clipped at Maastricht.  And 
this disappointment combined with a number of later mishaps (notably the Danish 
referendum result of 1992 and the crisis of the EMS) to ensure that the Commission’s 
mood would dip dramatically from mid-1992 onwards.  A bit like the Federal Republic 
itself some of the Commission’s gloom and depression throughout the mid to late 1990s 
was directly related to even if not entirely produced by the exhilaration and euphoria 
which had characterised the decade’s start. 
 The linkage between German reunification and Maastricht extends beyond the 
fate of the Commission’s foreign policy ambitions however.  This is not to say that there 
is much validity in the often repeated assertion that there was a Franco-German bargain 
in which Chancellor Kohl accepted EMU in return for Mitterrand’s acquiescence in 
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Germany unity.  This argument fails to grasp either the complexity of intra-Community 
bargaining which is always more complicated than simple Franco-German deals or the 
fact that there was already considerable momentum behind EMU before the Wall came 
down.  But it is to acknowledge that the determination with which Mitterrand, Kohl, 
Delors and several other of the key actors sought to move forward towards European 
union was greatly increased by the unification process.  The onward drive of European 
integration generally – and not just EMU – was therefore directly increased by what 
happened on November 9, 1989 and its aftermath.  Furthermore one could even argue 
that German reunification and its consequences contributed to the removal of the single 
biggest obstacle faced by those hoping to press on towards European union, namely Mrs 
Thatcher.  For amongst the numerous factors that contributed to the British Prime 
Ministers political demise, her doomed but very public opposition to German 
reunification was certainly of some importance.  It is thus possible to assert that both the 
timing and the contents of the Maastricht Treaty were significantly influenced by the 
transformation of Germany which had occurred between 1989 and 1990.  
 Similarly connections can and should be drawn between German unity and some 
of the EU’s trials and tribulations in the mid to later 1990s.  It is thus possible to argue 
that the EMS crisis of 1992 which was to prove so serious to the British debate about if 
not to the progression of the majority of other member states towards EMU was directly 
linked to the distorting effects caused by Germany’s short-lived post-unification boom.  
Similarly, the dynamics of European Union politics since unification have been strongly 
affected both by the disappearance of a Germany so often prepared to resolve budgetary 
and other disputes by a liberal use of the cheque book and by the more general 
underperformance of the German economy – both trends which to some extent at least 
are products of reunification.   
 Such interconnections, however, while almost certainly possible to multiply still 
further, should not really surprise.  As profound a transformation as the end of the cold 
war system into which the EC had been born and the reunification of the Community’s 
largest member state could scarcely have failed to have had a serious impact on the 
process of European integration.  What is surprising, however, is the failure thus far of 
most analysts – either those exploring the development of the EU or those studying the 
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wider international politics of Western Europe – to draw attention to the number and 
depths of interconnectedness.  This paper is thus intended as a small contribution towards 
the undoing of this serious historical oversight. 
 
 
